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Abstract
In this paper, we test two models of the Eurozone, with a special
emphasis on the role of money and monetary policy during crises. The
role of separability between money and consumption is investigated
further and we analyse the Euro area economy during three di⁄erent
crises: 1992, 2001 and 2007. We ￿nd that money has a rather signi￿-
cant role to play in explaining output variations during crises whereas,
at the same time, the role of monetary policy on output decreases
signi￿cantly. Moreover, we ￿nd that a model with non-separability
between consumption and money has better forecasting performance
than a baseline separable model over crisis periods.
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The ability to accurately forecast the future path for macroeconomic series
such as output or in￿ ation is crucial information for the business sector,
government and central bank in their decision-making process. Christiano,
Trabandt, and Walentin (2010) show that Dynamic Stochastic General Equi-
librium (DSGE) models provide valuable information about business cycle
dynamics and the e⁄ects of various economic shocks on the economy. For
all those reasons, DSGE models are increasingly being utilized by central
banks and other policy-making institutions to assist with policy decisions,
as pointed by Edge and G￿rkaynak (2010).
In policy analysis, it is believed that monetary policy has long and
variable e⁄ects on the overall economy. To capture such complex interac-
tions between policy variables and the economy as a whole, macroeconomic
forecasting becomes indispensable in actual policy making (Blinder, 1997;
Diebold, 1998). Sims and Zha (1998) introduced Bayesian methods to vec-
tor autoregressive (VAR) models to improve the accuracy of out-of-sample
forecasts in a dynamic multivariate framework. They showed how to com-
pute Bayesian probability distributions or error bands around out-of-sample
forecasts. More recently, researchers have started to examine the forecasting
performance of these models. In one such investigation, Smets and Wouters
(2007) show that a DSGE model can generate forecasts that have a lower
root mean-squared deviation (RMSD) than a Bayesian Vector Autoregres-
sion (BVAR).
On the other hand, Edge, Kiley and Laforte (2010) show that the out-of-
sample forecasting performance of the Federal Reserve Board￿ s new DSGE
model for the U.S. economy (EDO) is in many cases better than their large-
scale macro-econometric model (FRB/US).
In a DSGE framework applied to the Eurozone, Benchimol and Four￿ans
(2012) show that the role of money with respect to the economy, especially
on output dynamics, increases with risk aversion. Yet they don￿ t develop a
complete analysis of the role of money and of monetary policy during crisis
periods. The purpose of our paper is to ￿ll this gap by focusing on the
￿ uctuations of micro and macro parameters; on variance decompositions of
variables with respect to shocks; and on output and in￿ ation forecasts.
They have shown that money has an explicit role when risk aversion
is high enough, which may be the case during crisis periods. Yet, these
periods do not last long. And other parameters changes in the very short
term may also a⁄ect the role of money and monetary policy. That is why,






































2order to capture the impact of very short term parameters changes on the
dynamics of the model.
First, we compare two types of New Keynesian models in a DSGE frame-
work. The ￿rst model is a standard one whereby money is included in the
utility function with a separability assumption, as in the baseline model of
Gal￿ (2008). The second model introduces money in the utility function by
assuming non-separability between real money balances and consumption
as in Benchimol and Four￿ans (2012). By using Bayesian techniques, we
estimate these two models with Eurozone data over three di⁄erent crises:
during speculative attacks on currencies in the European Exchange Rate
Mechanism (ERM) at the beginning of the 1990s (Black Wednesday crisis);
following the bursting of the Dot-com bubble at the beginning of 2001 (Dot-
com crisis) ; and during the subprime crisis from 2007 to 2010 (Subprime
crisis).
Second, we analyze the results on the dynamics of the model, by study-
ing the variations of micro and macro parameters during these crisis periods
as well as the variance decomposition of the variables (notably current out-
put, ￿ exible-price output and in￿ ation) with respect to structural shocks
(preference shock, technology shock, money shock and interest rate shock).
We also study the forecasting performances of the two models over the pe-
riods under scrutiny. Focusing on these three periods sheds light on the
speci￿c role of money and monetary policy in crisis situations and leads to
interesting results as to output and in￿ ation dynamics during these periods.
The results show that the role of money increases during crises. It also
demonstrates that a New Keynesian model with non-separable preferences
between money and consumption is able to better forecast output than a
simple New Keynesian model with separable preferences during crises.
The study leads to policy implications as to the conduct of monetary
policy, especially during crisis periods.
In Section 2, we present the models used for the empirical analysis pre-
sented in Section 3. We analyze the ERM crisis in Section 4, the Dot-com
crisis in Section 5, and the Subprime crisis in Section 6. For each crisis, we
provide estimated parameters, variance decompositions and analyse predic-
tive properties of each model over time. We discuss the results and compare







































These two models consist of households that supply labor, purchase goods
for consumption, hold money and bonds, and ￿rms that hire labor and pro-
duce and sell di⁄erentiated products in monopolistically competitive goods
markets. Each ￿rm sets the price of the good it produces, but not all ￿rms
reset their price during each period. Households and ￿rms behave optimally:
households maximize the expected present value of utility, and ￿rms maxi-
mize pro￿ts. There is also a central bank that controls the nominal rate of
interest.
2.1 The separable baseline model
The following New Keynesian DSGE model is mainly inspired by Gal￿ (2008),
and serves as a baseline model.
2.1.1 Households








where Ut is the period utility function and ￿ < 1 is the discount factor.
We assume the existence of a continuum of goods represented by the
interval [0;1]. The household decides how to allocate its consumption ex-
penditures among the di⁄erent goods. This requires that the consumption
index Ct be maximized for any given level of expenditures. Furthermore,
and conditional on such optimal behavior, the period budget constraint takes
the form
PtCt + Mt + QtBt ￿ Bt￿1 + WtNt + Mt￿1 (2)
for t = 0;1;2:::, Pt is an aggregate price index, Mt is the quantity of money
holdings at time t, Bt is the quantity of one-period nominally riskless dis-
count bonds purchased in period t and maturing in period t+1 (each bond
pays one unit of money at maturity and its price is Qt where it = ￿logQt
is the short term nominal rate), Wt is the nominal wage, and Nt is hours of
work (or the measure of household members employed).
The above sequence of period budget constraints is supplemented with a
solvency condition, such as 8t lim
n￿!1






































2schemes. Preferences are measured with a common time-separable utility






















where consumption, labor, money and bond holdings are chosen to maximize
(3) subject to the budget constraint (2) and the solvency condition. ￿ is
the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion of households (or the inverse of the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution), # is the inverse of the elasticity of
money holdings with respect to the interest rate, and ￿ is the inverse of the
elasticity of work e⁄ort with respect to the real wage. The utility function
also contains two structural shocks: "
p
t is a general shock to preferences
that a⁄ects the intertemporal substitution of households (preference shock
accounts for changes in the marginal rate of substitution between goods, real
money balances and work) and "m
t is a money shock (it accounts for changes
in households￿money holdings). ￿ and ￿ are positive scale parameters.
2.1.2 Firms
We assume a continuum of ￿rms indexed by i 2 [0;1]. Each ￿rm produces
a di⁄erentiated good but uses an identical technology with the following
production function,
Yt (i) = AtNt (i)
1￿￿ (4)
where At = exp("a
t) is the level of technology assumed to be common to all
￿rms and to evolve exogenously over time, "a
t is the technology shock, and
￿ is the measure of decreasing returns.
All ￿rms face an identical isoelastic demand schedule, and take the ag-
gregate price level Pt and aggregate consumption index Ct as given. As in
the standard Calvo (1983) model, our generalization features monopolistic
competition and staggered price setting. At any time t, only a fraction 1￿￿
of ￿rms, with 0 < ￿ < 1, can reset their prices optimally, while the remaining
￿rms index their prices to lagged in￿ ation.
2.1.3 Central bank
Finally, the model is closed by adding the monetary policy smoothed Taylor-
type reaction function:
^ {t = (1 ￿ ￿i)
￿
￿￿ (^ ￿t ￿ ￿￿) + ￿x
￿











































2where ￿￿ and ￿x are policy coe¢ cients re￿ ecting the weight on in￿ ation and
on the output gap; the parameter 0 < ￿i < 1 captures the degree of interest
rate smoothing. "i
t is an exogenous ad hoc shock accounting for ￿ uctuations
of nominal interest rate.
2.1.4 Solution
The solution of this model leads to six equations with six variables: ￿ exible-
price output (^ y
f
t ), in￿ ation (^ ￿t), output (^ yt), real money balances ( c mpt),
and nominal interest rate (^ {t); and four structural shocks which are assumed
to follow a ￿rst-order autoregressive process with an i.i.d.-normal error term
such as "k
t = ￿k"k
t￿1 + !k;t where "k;t ￿ N (0;￿k) for k = fp;m;i;ag. The
lowercase superscript (^) denotes the log-linearized (around the steady state)















￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿ + ￿
(6)
^ ￿t = ￿Et [^ ￿t+1] +
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)(￿ (1 ￿ ￿) + ￿ + ￿)
￿(1 ￿ ￿ + ￿")
￿


























^ {t = (1 ￿ ￿i)
￿
￿￿ (^ ￿t ￿ ￿￿) + ￿x
￿




+ ￿i^ {t￿1 + "i
t (10)
where
￿m = ￿log(￿) + a1
￿n = ￿log(￿)
￿c = ￿log(￿)


















t is the shock on real money balances, "
p
t is the shock preferences, "i
t
is the exogenous component of the interest rate and "a







































22.2 The non-separable model


































where consumption, labor, money and bond holdings are chosen to maximize
(11) subject to the same budget constraint and the same solvency condition
as in the baseline model. This CES utility function depends positively on
the consumption of goods, Ct, positively on real money balances, Mt=Pt,
and negatively on labour Nt, as in the baseline model. ￿ is the inverse of
the elasticity of money holdings with respect to the interest rate, and can be
seen as a non separability parameter. b and ￿ are positive scale parameters.
We use the same production function and Taylor rule as in the baseline
model.
This New Keynesian DSGE model was developed in Benchimol and
Four￿ans (2012). As in the ￿rst model, it leads to six equations with six
macro variables: ￿ exible-price output (^ y
f
t ), ￿ exible-price real money bal-
ances (c mp
f
t ), in￿ ation (^ ￿t), output (^ yt), nominal interest rate (^ {t), and real




























^ ￿t = ￿Et [^ ￿t+1] + ￿x
￿




































































2^ {t = (1 ￿ ￿i)
￿
￿￿^ ￿t + ￿x
￿

































￿ (￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿)a1)
￿m
y = 1 + a2
￿ (￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿)a1)
￿x =
￿




(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)
(1￿￿)
￿(1￿￿+￿")















with a1 = 1
1+(b=(1￿b))1=￿(1￿￿)(￿￿1)=￿and a2 = 1
exp(1=￿)￿1.
As we assume that households get utility from holding money, these two
models include money in the utility function. The baseline model considers
separability between consumption and real money balances, as is generally
the case in the literature. In this case, real money balances are irrelevant
in explaining the dynamics of the model, due to this separability condition.
Consequently the money equation (9) becomes completely recursive from the
rest of the system. In that case, money has no role to play in the equations
explaining the other variables of the model (equations 6, 7, 8 and 10).
The second model introduces non-separability between consumption and
real money balances in order to analyse the situation where the marginal rate
of substitution between current and future consumption depends on current
and future real money balances. In that case money enters explicitly in
the equations that determine output (current output and its ￿ exible-price
counterpart) and in￿ ation (equations 13, 15 and 16). This results from
the fact that consumption and money being linked in the agents utility









































In our Eurozone model, ^ ￿t is the log-linearized in￿ ation rate measured as the
yearly log di⁄erence of GDP de￿ ator from one quarter to the same quarter
of the previous year, ^ yt is the log-linearized output measured as the yearly
log di⁄erence of GDP from one quarter to the same quarter of the previous
year, and ^ {t is the short-term (3-month) nominal interest rate. These data
are extracted from the Euro area Wide Model database (AWM) of Fagan
et al. (2001). c mpt is the log-linearized real money balances measured as
the yearly log di⁄erence of real money from one quarter to the same quarter
of the previous year, where real money is measured as the log di⁄erence
between the money stock and the GDP De￿ ator. We use the M3 mone-
tary aggregate from the OECD database. ^ y
f
t , the ￿ exible-price output, and
c mp
f
t , the ￿ exible-price real money balances are completely determined by
structural shocks.
3.2 Bayesian estimations
We study three di⁄erent crisis periods: 1990Q1 to 1993Q4, during the spec-
ulative attacks on currencies in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism
(Black Wednesday crisis); 2000Q1 to 2003Q4, during the burst of the Dot-
com bubble (Dot-com crisis); and 2006Q1 to 2009Q4, during the Subprime￿ s
crisis.
Calibration of the models is explained in Appendix 9.A and all the mar-
ginal densities are presented in Appendix 9.B.
Each period is of 16 quarters. For every quarter of each period we run
a Bayesian estimation by using the 25 observations before each respective
quarter. We thus obtain 16 Bayesian estimations for each period of analysis.
Our purpose here is not to present all these results, a very cumbersome
task indeed1. What is of interest is to draw from these estimations the
evolution of the micro and macro parameters, the unconditional variance
decomposition of variables with respect to shocks and the forecasting per-
formance of the two models.







































The above estimations provide the values of micro and macro parameters
through time. These parameters explain the dynamics of the di⁄erent vari-
ables during the crises under consideration.
The estimated micro parameters on which we concentrate are the risk
aversion coe¢ cient, the Taylor rule coe¢ cients, the measure of decreasing
returns, and the probability of ￿rms that reoptimize optimally their price
every period. The other parameters are calibrated.
Several key macro-parameters of the non-separable model are also ana-
lyzed, such as: the parameter of the gap between real money balances and its
￿ exible-price counterpart on in￿ ation (￿m); the expected real money growth
shock parameter on output (￿sm); the expected real money growth parame-
ter on output (￿mp); the ￿ exible-price real money parameter on ￿ exible-price
output (￿
y
m); and the money shock parameter on ￿ exible-price output (￿
y
sm).
Other common macro-parameter of the two models are analyzed, notably
the real interest rate parameter on output (￿r) and the technology shock
parameter on ￿ exible-price output (￿
y
a).
The successive estimations and simulations lead to variance decompo-
sitions of variables with respect to shocks. In order to study the role of
each shock on the variance of the variables, we analyze the unconditional
variance decomposition of output, in￿ ation, interest rate and real money bal-
ances with respect to the preference shock ("P
t ), the technology shock ("a
t),
the money shock ("M
t ) and the interest rate shock ("i
t). This analysis reveals
the potential role of money and monetary policy, but also of technology and
preferences on the dynamics of the system.
Finally, after each estimation, we run out-of-sample (over four periods,
i.e. one year) DSGE forecasts in order to compare the forecasting per-
formance of the two models. To conduct these forecasting exercises, we
simulate our estimated models from a given state and analyze the trajecto-
ries of the forecasted endogenous variables for the baseline model and the
non-separable money model. These forecasting exercises are done following
the Metropolis-Hastings iterations, on the basis of the posterior means of
each estimated variables. The main objective of this exercise is to compare
the forecasts to the actual data. Then, a comparison of the two models￿
forecasts is provided by the calculation of the Root Mean Square Deviation
(RMSD).
To illustrate the prediction performance of our DSGE models, we per-
form sixteen out-of-sample prediction over the three crises.






































2estimated every quarter, by taking twenty ￿ve observations before a given
quarter, and this for each of the sixteen quarters of a crisis period. For
each four out-of-sample forecast, we calculate the sum of the corresponding
RMSD values, and compare these values between the two models.
4 European Exchange Rate Mechanism crisis
4.1 Parameters analysis
The results of the Bayesian estimates are summarized in the following ￿g-
ures, where each date corresponds to the end of each estimation sample (of
twenty ￿ve observations).
In all the ￿gures, the dashed line refers to the non-separable model while
the solid line refers to the baseline model.
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Figure 1: Parameters variations (1990Q1 to 1993Q4)
Figure 1 shows the evolution of micro and macro-parameters. Even






































2ations may be enough to explain changes in the dynamic impact of shocks on
variables and on the overall interdependent system of equations over time.
A closer look at the value of these parameters shows that risk aver-
sion, the expected money growth parameter on output, the expected money
growth shock parameter on output, and the in￿ ation and output coe¢ cients
of the Taylor rule, display a small peak in 1992Q1.
Moreover, after the Black Wednesday crisis (i.e. after 1993Q1), more
￿rms choose to reoptimize optimally their prices. During the period, the
real interest rate parameter on output and the technology shock parameter
on ￿ exible-price output are rather constant.
There does not exist wide di⁄erences between both models as to the







































For each Bayesian estimation of the two models, we compute the uncondi-
tional variance decomposition of the variables. This variance decomposition
gives interesting information as to the role of each shock.
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Figure 2: Variance decomposition in percent (1990Q1 to 1993Q4)
Figure 2 shows that money plays a non-negligible role in output vari-
ations during the European Monetary System crisis. This role reaches its
maximum in 1991Q4, where about 10% of the output￿ s variance is explained
by the money shock. This result is mainly due to the variation in the ex-
pected money growth parameter and in the expected money growth shock
parameter on output (see Figure 1). After and before the crisis, money
seems to play a less signi￿cant role. We don￿ t present the role of money on
in￿ ation as far as it is almost nil (less than 0.1%).
Figure 2 also shows that the role of monetary policy on output and
in￿ ation decreases by the end of the crisis, and that technology plays a lower
role during the crisis, especially as far as ￿ exible-price output is concerned.






































2ences explain 100% of the output variance. The role of technology increases
after 1993Q1, at the same time as the role of monetary policy, of money and
of preferences decrease.
The role of preferences on interest rates and in￿ ation increases after the
crisis (this role is negligible on real money balances) whereas it decreases on
output.
4.3 Forecasting performances
From each Bayesian estimation, we simulate the out-of-sample forecasts of
output and in￿ ation over the next four periods (one year).










Comparison of output and inflation DSGE forecast errors
Positive bar: Non-Separable model is better
Negative bar: Baseline model is better
Inflation
Output
Figure 3: Out-of-sample forecasting errors (DSGE Forecast)
A negative number implies that the non-separable money model￿ s RMSD
is higher than the baseline model￿ s RMSD. In that case the baseline model
has better forecasting performances than the non-separable model. Figure 3






































2power for output dynamics than the baseline model between 1990Q2 and
1991Q2 and during the speculative attacks on currencies in the European
Exchange Rate Mechanism between 1992Q2 and 1992Q4.
From 1990Q1 to 1991Q2, the non-separable model has a better predictive
power of in￿ ation dynamics whereas the performances are mixed during the
other periods.
4.4 Interpretation
Black Wednesday refers to the events of 16 September 1992 when the British
Conservative government withdrawed the pound sterling from the European
Exchange Rate Mechanism. Yet other crises occurred during our period of
analysis.
From 1990Q2 to 1991Q2, an oil crisis followed the ￿rst Gulf war2. From
1992Q2 to 1992Q4, the Russian crisis3 and the French Real Estate crisis4
could have a⁄ected the Eurozone business cycle. Figure 1 shows that during
this period several parameters reach a peak.
Figure 2 shows that from 1990Q3 on the impact of money on (current
and ￿ exible-price) output increases and remains at a higher level until about
the end of the period. This impact is higher than what Ireland (2004) and
AndrØs, L￿pez-Salido, and VallØs (2006) found. The reason for this result
seems mainly due to the variation of the expected money growth parameter
and of the expected money growth shock parameter on output (Figure 1).
Figure 2 also indicates that, since 1992Q4, the beginning of the ERM
crisis, the role of monetary policy on output and in￿ ation has decreased and
reached its lowest level at the top of the crisis (1993Q3).
The RMSD errors comparison (Figure 3) and the business cycles of the
period are anticorrelated, showing that the non-separable model has a better
predictive power of output than the baseline model during the lower part
of the cycle. Moreover, during the Black Wednesday period (after 1992Q2),
and during the other crises mentioned above (from 1990Q2 to 1991Q2), the
non-separable model demonstrates a better predictive power of output than
over the other periods.
These ￿ndings con￿rm the predictive abilities of the non-separable model
during crisis periods, whereby the role of money on output increases.
2The 1990 oil price spike occurred in response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August
2, 1990. The war lasted until February 28, 1991.
3The constitutional crisis of 1993 was a political stand-o⁄between the Russian president
and the Russian parliament that was resolved by using military force.








































The following ￿gure presents the Bayesian estimation results of micro and
macro parameters through time during the Dot-com crisis (2000Q1 to 2003Q4).
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Figure 4: Parameters variations (2000Q1 to 2003Q4)
Figure 4 shows that if the risk aversion parameter does not change much
over the period, at least in absolute terms, it gets to a peak whenever trou-
bles happen: around 2000Q4 when the internet bubble started to burst and
in 2001Q3 around the time of the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
In absolute terms the other parameters do not change much either even
though the money related parameters on output (current and its ￿ exible-
price counterpart) show also a peak in 2000Q4 and remain at a somewhat







































The following ￿gure presents the variance decomposition of variables through
time during the Dot-com crisis (2000Q1 to 2003Q4).
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Figure 5: Variance decomposition in percent (2000Q1 to 2003Q4)
Figure 5 shows that since 2001Q2, the role of money on output and on
￿ exible-price output has increased. However, this role is rather minor. As in
the ERM crisis, the role of money on in￿ ation is negligible (not presented).
After the bubble bursting, i.e. mainly after 2000Q4, the role of monetary
policy on in￿ ation increases whereas the change is not visible on output.
As in Figure 2, Figure 5 also shows that technology plays a lower role in
explaining current and ￿ exible-price outputs during the crisis.
5.3 Forecasting performances
Figure 6 shows that the non-separable model is signi￿cantly better than
the baseline model over the whole period (except in 2000Q2), in terms of


















































Comparison of output and inflation DSGE forecast errors
Positive bar: Non-Separable model is better
Negative bar: Baseline model is better
Inflation
Output
Figure 6: Out-of-sample forecasting errors (DSGE Forecast)
model is the best (the RMSD di⁄erences of the in￿ ation forecasts are rather
small).
5.4 Interpretation
The bursting of the Dot-com bubble occurs in the Eurozone approximately
two quarters (2000Q4) after the United States (2000Q2). Even if the role
of money on output before 2001Q4 is small, it increases after this date. Be-
tween 2001Q1 and 2001Q4, the core of the Dot-com crisis, the role of tech-
nology on output reaches its minimum. This result con￿rms the decreasing
role of technology on output dynamics during this crisis.
The percentage of the variance of output and ￿ exible price-output ex-
plained by the money shock is small and close to the value found by AndrØs,
L￿pez-Salido, and VallØs (2006). Moreover, although the Taylor rule coe¢ -






































2and in￿ ation has increased since the beginning of the period (Figure 5).
The clear dominance of the non-separable model over the baseline model
in terms of output forecasting errors con￿rms the predictive abilities of the
non-separable model during crisis periods.
6 Subprime crisis
6.1 Parameters analysis
The following ￿gures present the Bayesian estimation results through time
over the subprime crisis (2006Q1 to 2009Q4).
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Figure 7: Parameters variations (2006Q1 to 2009Q4)
Figure 7 shows that after the Lehman Brother￿ s bankruptcy (2008Q4),
the risk aversion parameter decreases, whatever the model.
The expected money growth shock parameter on output reaches its max-
imum in 2008Q3 whereas the other parameters of output and ￿ exible-price






































2The money growth parameter on in￿ ation also reaches its maximum in
2008Q3, but its variations are not large.
Even if the variations are small, the weights on in￿ ation and on output in
the Taylor rule reach a peak in 2007Q4 and in 2008Q4, while the smoothing
parameter reaches on the contrary its lowest values.
6.2 Variance decomposition
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Figure 8: Variance decomposition in percent (2006Q1 to 2009Q4)
Figure 8 shows that the role of the money shock on output increases in
2007 and reaches a peak in 2008Q2. This shock explains around 5% of the
variance in 2006Q4, whereas the percentage increases to 12% in 2008Q2,
and goes back to 4% in 2009Q4. The impact of money on the ￿ exible-price
output follows about the same dynamic path.
As in the other crises, and because it is insigni￿cant, we don￿ t represent
the role of money on in￿ ation.






































2and in￿ ation follows the same pattern as with the money shock, but it gets
its higher level a little earlier (2007Q1). Monetary policy explains most of
the in￿ ation variance, with a maximum in 2007Q3.
Figure 8 also shows that the role of preferences on output, interest rates,
and real money balances is lower during the crisis than before and after
the crisis. Technology has a lower role in explaining ￿ exible-price output
variance at the beginning of the crisis than before and after the crisis. The
role of technology on output and in￿ ation grows up signi￿cantly after the
crisis.
A simultaneous analysis of all the shocks indicates that the increasing
role of money on output is associated with a decline in the role of monetary
policy and of preferences. These declining impacts start at the beginning of
the subprime crisis.
6.3 Forecasting performances









Comparison of output and inflation DSGE forecast errors
Positive bar: Non-Separable model is better
Negative bar: Baseline model is better
Inflation
Output






































2Figure 9 shows that the non-separable model provides better forecasts
of output than the baseline model at the core of the ￿nancial crisis (2007Q2
to 2008Q3). The in￿ ation RMSDs are about the same over the period.
6.4 Interpretation
The subprime crisis can be attributed to a number of factors pervasive in
both housing and credit markets, factors which emerged over a number of
years. For Cecchetti (2009) and Mishkin (2010), a complete chronology
of the crisis might starts in 2007Q1 when several large subprime mortgage
lenders started to report losses. The real trigger of the crisis was in 2007Q3
when the French bank BNP Paribas temporarily halted redemptions from
three of its funds that held assets backed by U.S. subprime mortgage debt.
As a direct consequence, credit spreads began widening, overnight inter-
est rates in Europe shot up, and the European Central Bank immediately
responded with the largest short-term liquidity injection in her nine year
history. Furthermore, if the global ￿nancial crisis began in 2007 in the US,
the Eurozone entered its ￿rst o¢ cial recession in 2008Q3.
The Euro Group heads of states and governments and the European
Central Bank (ECB) held an extraordinary summit in October 2008 to de￿ne
a joint action for the Eurozone. They agreed on a bank rescue plan which
would involve hundreds of billions of euros: governments would enter banks
capital and guarantee interbank lending. That may explain the decrease in
risk aversion after 2008Q4 (Figure 7), and the decreasing role of money on
output variations after this date.
These results also suggests that at the top of the crisis, the role of money
is at its highest. Contrary to Ireland (2004) and AndrØs, L￿pez-Salido, and
VallØs (2006), it shows that money had a signi￿cant role to play during the
￿nancial crisis.
To understand better the relationship between the role of money and
￿nancial risk, it is interesting to introduce the evolution of the interest rate
spread over the period. This spread5 provides an assessment of counterparty
risk from one bank lending to another, re￿ ecting both liquidity and credit
risk concerns.
As Figure 10 shows, the dynamics of the role of money on output during
the crisis is positively related to the widening of the spread between the
Euribor and both baselines interest rates (Bubill and BTF).
5The spread is measured as the di⁄erence between the 3-month Euribor and a short
maturity bond. As an European bond does not exist, we choose the 3-month BTF (France)















































Role of Money on Output
10x(EURIBOR-BTF)
10x(EURIBOR-Bubill)
Figure 10: Comparison between the role of money on output (variance de-
composition) and the spreads between the Bubill/BTF and the Euribor
In the same vein, Figure 11 shows that the role of monetary policy
decreases as the same time as the spread increases. If the role of monetary
policy is at its maximum before the crisis starts (2007Q2), it diminishes
quickly after: its impact on output is divided by four, declining from 40%
to about 10%.
The RMSD analysis also reveals that the DSGE model with non-separable
utility fares quite well against the baseline model after 2007Q2, that is af-
ter the beginning of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Given the stability
of the macro parameters (Figure 7), it can be inferred that this increasing
role is mainly due to micro parameters variations such as variations of the
risk aversion parameter (￿) or of the percentage of ￿rms reoptimizing their















































Role of Monetary Policy on Output
10x(EURIBOR-BTF)
10x(EURIBOR-Bubill)
Figure 11: Comparison between the role of monetry policy on output and
the spreads between Bubill/BTF and Euribor
7 A comparison of the three crises
To better assess the relationship between money, monetary policy and out-
put during the crises under consideration, and to better understand the
respective role of the shocks, a comparison of variance decompositions be-
tween the di⁄erent crises is useful. For the Subprime crisis and the European
Exchange Rate Mechanism crisis, money plays a more signi￿cant role on out-
put (more than 10%) than during the Dot-com crisis (less than 4%). These
values must be compared to Ireland (2004), AndrØs, L￿pez-Salido, and Val-
lØs (2006) and AndrØs, L￿pez-Salido, and Nelson (2009), which found that
money￿ s role in the business cycle appears limited. Money plays a stronger
role during the Subprime crisis (12.5%) than during the other crises. Simi-
larly, money plays a stronger role on ￿ exible-price output at the beginning of
the Subprime crisis (16.5%) than during the other crises, where the money






































21992Q1 (beginning of the ERM crisis) and about 5% in 2002Q1 (Dot-com
crisis).
The period where the role of technology on ￿ exible-price output is at
its minimum seems to be at the peak of the crisis, and this for the three
crises. This result means probably that technology has a lower role to play
in explaining ￿ exible-price output during crisis than during more normal
periods where ￿ exible-price output variability is completely determined by
the technology shock. The decline of the role of technology on ￿ exible-price
output is furthermore associated with a corresponding increase of the role
of money on ￿ exible-price output.
Preferences seems to play a role on all variables only during the subprime
crisis, and this for both models. The preference shock has a signi￿cant
impact on output and interest rates before the Subprime crisis, yet this
impact diminishes during the crisis (divided by almost two). This behavior
may be due to the importance of the role of money, especially during the
Global Financial Crisis.
It is also interesting to note that over the three crisis, the impact of
monetary policy on output is di⁄erent. It is around 35% at the top of the
Dot-com crisis whereas it reaches almost 50% at the top of the ERM and of
the Subprime crisis.
The impact of monetary policy on in￿ ation is also di⁄erent over the three
crises. It appears to be lower during the ERM crisis and the Dot-com crisis
than during the Subprime crisis.
Finally, in terms of forecasting, the non-separable model performs gen-
erally better than the separable one, as shown in Figure 3, 6 and 9.
8 Conclusion
The goal of this paper was to study the role of money and monetary policy
during crises periods. To achieve this goal, we compared the performance
of two DSGE models, one baseline model with separable preferences, as in
Gal￿ (2008), and one with non-separable preferences between consumption
and real money balances, as in Benchimol and Four￿ans (2012); the study
is carried over three crisis periods: European ERM crisis (1992), Dot-com
crisis (2001) and Subprime crisis (2007).
We tested the two models by using successive Bayesian estimations, so
as to obtain empirical estimates of the evolution of parameters, variance
decomposition and forecasting performances of both models over the three






































2increases during crises. Yet this role was higher during the ERM and the
Subprime crises than during the Dot-com crisis. It also demonstrates that
the model with non-separable preferences provides better forecasts of output
than with the baseline model over these crisis periods.
Moreover, our results show that the impact of monetary policy on output
variability diminishes signi￿cantly during the Subprime crisis, at the same
time as the impact of money increases. In￿ ation does not seem to be a⁄ected
directly by money variables, it is mainly explained by monetary policy over
the three crises.
Our ￿ndings support the view that New Keynesian DSGE models with
non-separability between consumption and real money balances should be
preferred to separable models, as far as macroeconomic forecasting is con-
cerned, at least during crisis periods.
Our results provide also interesting clues regarding the structural dy-
namics of the economy that may help inform central banks, markets and
policy regulators. For example, the more signi￿cant role played by real
money balances than generally expected during ￿nancial crises.
All in all, our analysis has highlighted the importance of money during
crises, and showed that the hypothesis of non-separability between money
and consumption leads to better forecast during these periods than when
money and consumption are taken as separable.
9 Appendix
A Calibration
We calibrate all parameters, excepted shocks￿parameters (￿k and ￿k for k =
fp;m;i;ag), the risk aversion parameter (￿), the price adjustment parameter
(￿), the decreasing return parameter (￿) of the production function and the
Taylor rule￿ s parameters (￿i, ￿￿, ￿x). The monetary policy rule is an ad-hoc
reaction function and completely dependent on the monetary authority.
Following standard conventions, we calibrate beta distributions for pa-
rameters that fall between zero and one, inverted gamma distributions for
parameters that need to be constrained to be greater than zero, and normal
distributions in other cases.
The calibration of ￿ is inspired by Rabanal and Rubio-Ramirez (2005)
and by Casares (2007). They choose, respectively, a risk aversion parameter
of 2:5 and 1:5. In line with these values, we consider that ￿ = 2 corresponds






































2the same risk aversion calibration.
As in Smets and Wouters (2007), the standard errors of the innovations
are assumed to follow inverse gamma distributions and we choose a beta
distribution for shock persistence parameters (as well as for the backward
component of the Taylor rule) that should be lesser than one.
The calibration of ￿, ￿, ￿, ￿, and " comes from Gal￿ (2008) and Casares
(2007). The smoothed Taylor rule (￿i, ￿￿, and ￿x) is calibrated following
Gerlach-Kristen (2003), analogue priors as those used by Smets and Wouters
(2003). In order to take into consideration possible changes in the behav-
ior of the central bank, we assign a higher standard error for the Taylor
rule￿ s coe¢ cients. v (the non-separability parameter) must be greater than
one. ￿i (equation 17) must be greater than one as far as this parameter
depends on the elasticity of substitution of money with respect to the cost
of holding money balances, as explained in S￿derstr￿m (2005); while still
informative, this prior distribution is dispersed enough to allow for a wide
range of possible and realistic values to be considered (i.e. ￿ > v > 1).
The calibration of the shock persistence parameters and the standard
errors of the innovations follows FŁve, Matheron, and Sahuc (2010), where
a much lower mean is adopted for ￿a. All the standard errors of shocks are
assumed to be distributed according to inverted Gamma distributions, with
prior means of 0.02. The latter law ensures that these parameters have a
positive support. The autoregressive parameters are all assumed to follow
Beta distributions. Except for technology shocks, all these distributions are
centered around 0.75. We take a common standard error of 0.1 for the shock






































2Table 1: Calibration for the two models
Priors
Law Mean Std.
￿ beta 0.33 0.05
￿ beta 0.66 0.05








￿i beta 0.50 0.10
￿￿ normal 3.00 0.20
￿x normal 1.50 0.20
￿a beta 0.75 0.10
￿i beta 0.75 0.10
￿p beta 0.75 0.10
￿m beta 0.75 0.10
￿a invgamma 0.02 2.00
￿i invgamma 0.02 2.00
￿P invgamma 0.02 2.00







































In what follows, we present all the marginal densities of our estimates. The
dashed line refers to the non-separable model while the solid line refer to
the baseline model.

























































For the three crises, both models have approximately the same log mar-
ginal densities.
References
Adolfson, M., Laseen, S., LindØ, J., and Villani, M., 2007. Bayesian estima-
tion of an open economy DSGE model with incomplete pass-through.
Journal of International Economics 72(2), 481-511.
Adolfson, M., Laseen, S., LindØ, J., and Villani, M., 2008. Evaluating an
estimated new Keynesian small open economy model. Journal of Eco-






































2An, S., and Schorfheide, F., 2007. Bayesian analysis of DSGE models. Econo-
metric Reviews 26(2-4), 113-172.
AndrØs, J., L￿pez-Salido, J.D., and Nelson, E., 2009. Money and the natural
rate of interest: Structural estimates for the United States and the Euro
area. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 33(3), 758-776.
AndrØs, J., L￿pez-Salido, J.D., and VallØs, J., 2006. Money in an estimated
business cycle model of the Euro area. The Economic Journal 116(511),
457-477.
Benchimol, J., and Four￿ans, A., 2012. Money and risk in a DSGE frame-
work: A Bayesian application to the Eurozone. Journal of Macroeco-
nomics, ISSN 0164-0704, 10.1016/j.jmacro.2011.10.003.
Blinder, A.S., 1997. Is There a Core of Practical Macroeconomics That We
Should All Believe ?. American Economic Review 87(2), 240-43.
Casares, M., 2007. Monetary policy rules in a new Keynesian Euro area
model. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 39(4), 875-900.
Calvo, G.A., 1983. Staggered prices in a utility-maximizing framework. Jour-
nal of Monetary Economics 12(3), 383-398.
Cecchetti, S.G., 2009. Crisis and responses: The Federal Reserve in the early
stages of the ￿nancial crisis. Journal of Economic Perspectives 23(1),
51-75.
Christiano, L.J., Trabandt, M., and Walentin, K., 2010. DSGE Models for
Monetary Policy Analysis. NBER Working Papers #16074.
Diebold, F.X., 1998. The Past, Present, and Future of Macroeconomic Fore-
casting. Journal of Economic Perspectives 12(2), 175-92.
Edge, R.M., and G￿rkaynak, R.S., 2010. How useful are estimated DSGE
model forecasts for central bankers ? Brookings Papers on Economic
Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution 41(2),
209-259.
Edge, R.M., Kiley, M.T., and Laforte, J.P., 2010. A comparison of forecast
performance between Federal Reserve sta⁄ forecasts, simple reduced-







































2Fagan, G., Henry, J., and Mestre, R., 2001. An area-wide model (AWM) for
the Euro area. European Central Bank Working Paper No. 42.
Fernandez-Villaverde, J., and Rubio-Ramirez, J.F., 2004. Comparing dy-
namic equilibrium models to data: a Bayesian approach. Journal of
Econometrics 123(1), 153-187.
FŁve, P., Matheron, J., and Sahuc, J.G., 2010. In￿ ation target shocks and
monetary policy inertia in the Euro area. Economic Journal 120(547),
1100-1124.
Gal￿, J., 2008. Monetary Policy, In￿ ation and the business cycle: An intro-
duction to the new Keynesian framework. Princeton University Press.
Gerlach-Kristen, P., 2003. Interest rate reaction functions and the Taylor
rule in the Euro area. European Central Bank Working Paper No. 258.
Geweke, J.F., Keane, M.P., and Runkle, D.E., 1997. Statistical inference
in the multinomial multiperiod probit model. Journal of Econometrics
80(1), 125-165.
Ireland, P.N., 2004. Money￿ s role in the monetary business cycle. Journal of
Money, Credit and Banking 36(6), 969-983.
Jacquier, E., Polson, N.G., and Rossi, P.E., 2002. Bayesian Analysis of Sto-
chastic Volatility Models. Journal of Business and Economic Statistics
20(1), 69-87.
Mishkin, F.S., 2010. Over the cli⁄: From the Subprime to the Global Fi-
nancial Crisis. Journal of Economic Perspectives 25(1), 49￿ 70.
Nelson, E., 2002. Direct e⁄ects of base money on aggregate demand: theory
and evidence. Journal of Monetary Economics 49(4), 687-708.
Rabanal, P., and Rubio-Ramirez, J.F., 2005. Comparing new Keynesian
models of the business cycle: A Bayesian approach. Journal of Monetary
Economics 52(6), 1151-1166.
Sims, C.A., and Zha, T., 1998. Bayesian Methods for Dynamic Multivariate
Models. International Economic Review 39(4), 949-68.
Smets, F.R., and Wouters, R., 2003. An Estimated Dynamic Stochastic
General Equilibrium Model of the Euro Area. Journal of the European






































2Smets, F., and Wouters, R., 2007. Shocks and frictions in US business cycles:
a Bayesian DSGE approach. American Economic Review 97(3), 586-
606.
S￿derstr￿m, U., 2005. Targeting in￿ ation with a role for money. Economica
72(288), 577-596.
Walsh, C.E., 2010. Monetary theory and policy. The MIT Press.














































ISSN 1291-9616  
h
a
l
-
0
0
6
7
2
8
0
6
,
 
v
e
r
s
i
o
n
 
1
 
-
 
2
2
 
F
e
b
 
2
0
1
2